国会在国际紧急经济权力法(IEEPA)中面临的问题和选择

本报告根据Congressional Research Service (CRS) 于2022年3月25日发布的《The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use 》全文翻译

国会可能希望解决一系列与 IEEPA有关的问题，但以下将讨论两个问题：第一个是国会如何根据IEEPA及其总纲法律NEA授予总统权力；第二个是在《2018年出口管制改革法》中所做出的选择。

IEEPA的授权

虽然NEA和IEEPA的起草者宣称该法案的目的是限制紧急权力的使用，但通过实践不断推进后这种权力的使用范围已经扩大了。总统们宣布国家进入的紧急状态，通过不断延长持续数年甚至数十年。按IEEPA规定针对涉及外国利益的交易的限制是为了限制IEEPA在国内的应用。然而，全球化已经侵蚀了这一限制，因为今天很少有交易不涉及外国利益。IEEPA本应解决的如磋商、时间限制、国会审查、权力范围，以及与宣布的紧急状态的逻辑关系却没有得到解决，这些都是学者们今天对IEEPA提出的批评。³⁴⁸TWEA因为被第一次根据其权力宣布的国家紧急状态持续了41年而受到批评。³⁴⁹到2022年11月，根据IEEPA的授权宣布的第一个紧急状态，即1979年宣布的伊朗紧急状态，将进入第43个年头。

总的来说，学者们对NEA和IEEPA的规定提出的批评主要有三个，国会可能会对此感兴趣。首先，NEA和IEEPA均没有定义“国家紧急状态”和“异常和重大的威胁”，总统们对这些术语的解释很宽泛。其次，在高度全球化的时代，总统的权力范围受到的限制越来越少。第三，由于最高法院的裁决和对NEA的修订，国会很可能必须有三分之二的多数而不是简单的多数才能终止国家紧急状态。尽管存在这些批评，国会并没有采取行动终止或以其他方式对总统援引IEEPA的紧急状态表示不满。没有任何明确的反对，加上在某些情况下明确的批准，可能表明国会批准了总统迄今为止对IEEPA的使用。因此，可以解读为IEEPA是为执行国会意志的有效工具。

对“国家紧急状态”和“异常和重大的威胁”的定义

NEA和IEEPA都没有定义什么是“国家紧急状态”。IEEPA规定的前提条件是，在声明中援引它来处理“对美国国家安全、外交政策或经济的异常和重大的威胁”的必要性。³⁵⁰在众议院对IEEPA的标注中，时任财政部国际事务助理部长弗雷德ž伯格斯滕高度评价了IEEPA所指的国家紧急状态是“基于异常和重大的威胁”，因为这一措辞“强调了只有在真正的紧急状态下才能使用这样的权力。” ³⁵¹ “异常的”和“重大的”也是没有定义的，常规情况下援引该法似乎与这些法定条件相冲突。

如果国会想细化“国家紧急状态”或“异常和重大的威胁”的含义，可以通过制定法律来实现。 此外，国会可以考虑要求法院在行使任何权力之前或之后不久，如《1792年第一民兵法》³⁵²或《外国情报监视法》³⁵³等规定的权力时，做出某种事实性裁决。另外，国会也可能是考虑到，现行法规的模糊性为行政部门提供了必要的灵活性，使其能够以必要的速度处理国家紧急状况。

授权的范围

尽管 IEEPA名义上只适用于外国交易，但“任何外国或其国民的任何利益”这一短语的广泛性为行政的自由裁量留下了巨大的空间。现代全球经济的相互联系使得很少有重大交易不涉及外国利益。³⁵⁴因此，至少有一位学者得出了这样的结论：“纯粹的国内交易不受总统的交易管制，似乎是一种没有实际意义的限制。” ³⁵⁵

自20世纪80年代以来，当《出口管理法》（EAA）的一般授权到期时，总统们利用IEEPA来管制出口，以维持《出口管理条例》（EAR）中规定的对双重用途出口管制制度。即在国会没有重新授权EAA时，总统通过宣布进入紧急状态，以维持对双重用途出口管制制度。³⁵⁶目前该紧急状态自2001年以来持续至今。³⁵⁷

虽然总统们曾利用IEEPA对对手实施贸易限制，但它并没有被总统援引作为征收关税的法律依据。然而，如上所述，尼克松总统在终止美元与黄金的可兑换性后，利用TWEA对进入美国的物项征收10%的从价关税，以避免国际收支危机。虽然在这个例子中总统使用TWEA在当时受到了批评，³⁵⁸但美国海关和专利上诉法院支持尼克松总统的行动，³⁵⁹国会在随后的改革中以几乎相同的形式保留了尼克松总统所依赖的措辞，最终导致了IEEPA的颁布施行。³⁶⁰在第116届和第117届国会，都提出了限制总统使用IEEPA征收关税的权力的法案。³⁶¹

对个人目标的权力范围也很广泛。根据IEEPA，总统有权禁止与行政命令指定的个人进行所有金融交易。这种权力允许总统查封一个美国公民或永久居民的所有资产。³⁶²

对IEEPA的这种使用可能反映了国会的意愿，也可能代表了一种可能已经超出国会最初意图的权力授予。         

终止国家紧急状态或IEEPA权力

NEA和IEEPA削减总统权力的核心是规定国会可以通过一项共同决议以终止根据NEA宣布的紧急状态。当该“立法否决权”被最高法院推翻时【见IEEPA的司法解释——国际紧急经济权力法的起源、演变和使用（五）】，国会面临更大的困难——可能需要通过一项具有否决权的联合决议——以终止根据NEA宣布的国家紧急状态。³⁶³迄今为止已经通过了两项这样的决议，但终止相关的紧急状态声明都没有涉及援引IEEPA而宣布的紧急状态。³⁶⁴国会在此缺乏行动，可能是由于必须要获得支持否决的多数票，也可能是迄今为止IEEPA的使用确实是反映了国会的意愿。

如果国会想对IEEPA的使用主张更多的权力，它可以修改NEA或IEEPA，加入一个“日落条款”，即在一定天数后终止任何国家紧急状态。至少有一位学者建议进行这样的修订。³⁶⁵或者国会可以通过修订IEEPA而加入一个审查程序，让国会发挥积极作用。在第116届和第117届国会上，都提出了几项法案，要求通过联合决议才能批准紧急状态延长到一定天数以上。例如，《2021年国家安全权力法》要求国会在30天内通过一项联合决议批准国家进入紧急状态。³⁶⁶

现状

1977年在众议院国际关系委员会作证时，哈罗德·G·迈尔教授总结了对TWEA的批评集中在以下:

第5条(b)款的效力不再局限于现有迫在眉睫的危险意义上的“紧急状态”。国会对其授予总统的权力范围的宽泛的行政解释的持续追溯批准，或明或暗，已将该款转化为对总统授予的一般性立法权……”³⁶⁷

与之前的TWEA一样，IEEPA也是美国现代制裁制度的核心法律。与之前的TWEA一样，国会经常明确批准总统援引IEEPA。在某些情形，国会甚至指示总统根据IEEPA实施各种制裁，并放弃宣布紧急状态的法定条件。即使在国会没有明确批准的情况下，也从未有国会议员提出过以IEEPA为由终止国家紧急状态的议案。³⁶⁸ NEA要求参众两院每6个月举行一次会议，考虑就终止紧急状态的联合决议进行投票。³⁶⁹两家议院从未就援引IEEPA的紧急状态召开过这样的会议。对于公众对IEEPA授予总统的紧急状态权力的规模和范围的担忧，维持现状的支持者会辩称，国会已经默许了对该法律及其使用的批准。事实上，一些在NEA下提议限制国家紧急状态持续时间的法案明确地将IEEPA排除在外。³⁷⁰

2018年《出口管制改革法》

2018年，国会通过了《出口管制改革法》(ECRA)。³⁷¹该立法废除了已过期的1979年《出口管理法》，³⁷²该法的规定自2001年以来一直参照IEEPA继续执行。³⁷³ECRA成为出口管制的新的法律授权。然而，1979年《出口管理法》中涉及的若干出口管制规定并未移植到2018年的ECRA中；³⁷⁴相反，国会选择要求总统继续使用IEEPA来继续实施1979年《出口管理法》中没有被移植的三个条款。³⁷⁵展望未来，国会可能希望重新审议这些条款，因为它们都与遏制大规模毁灭性武器的扩散有关。

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Note：

348 See, e.g., Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint”; Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism.”

349 See, e.g., “After 41 Years The Depression Finally Ending,” New York Times, October 13, 1974; “Senate Votes to Conclude 4 National Emergencies,” New York Times, October 8, 1974; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v.

350 50 U.S.C. §1701.

351 House Markup, p. 12.

352 Using the judiciary to determine whether an emergency authority can be exercised by the executive has been common. The First Militia Act of 1792, for example, required that either an associate justice of the Supreme Court of a district judge confirm that an insurrection “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings” existed. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. Using a court to determine whether an emergency existed and whether an action was necessary was also the method favored by the German-American jurist, advisor to President Abraham Lincoln, and founder of American political science, Francis Lieber, who argued that the acts of officials in states of emergency should be adjudged in court “to be necessary in the judgment of a moderate and reasonable man.” Qtd. in Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” p. 588.

353 50 U.S.C. §§1803-1805.

354 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Harvard Law Review, p. 1111 n49.

355 Ibid.; See also Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” pp. 757-758.

356 In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act to provide new statutory authority for the continuation of EAR. However, three sections were not repealed and Congress directed their continued application through the exercise of IEEPA. See “The Export Control Reform Act of 2018” below.

357 Ibid.

358 See, e.g., the testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations and Markup of the Trading with the Enemy Reform Legislation, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 8-9.

359 United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (“Congress, in enacting s 5(b) of the TWEA, authorized the President, during an emergency, to […] ‘regulate importation,’ by imposing an import duty surcharge or by other means appropriately and reasonably related […] to the particular nature of the emergency declared.”).

360 TWEA, codified as amended in 1971 at §5(b), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” IEEPA, as passed in 1977 at §203(a)(1)(B), provided that during a period of national emergency, the President may “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” While he did not ultimately end up doing so, President Trump announced his intention to use IEEPA to impose and gradually increase a five percent tariff on all goods imported from Mexico. Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-address-border-crisis/. See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. Casey.

361 E.g., Protecting Our Democracy Act, S. 2921 (Klobuchar), 117th Cong., 1st sess., September 30, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act of 2021, H.R. 2618 (Davidson), 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 16, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, S. 691 (Lee), 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2021; Global Trade Accountability Act, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2019.

362 Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” p. 759.

363 Congress amended NEA in 1985 to require a joint resolution, which is subject to the President’s veto, to terminate an emergency. P.L. 99-93 (August 16, 1985), 99 Stat. 405.

364 In 2005, Rep. George Miller (CA) introduced a resolution to terminate the declaration of a national emergency as a result of Hurricane Katrina. It was not considered. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 8, 2005. In 2019, Rep. Castro and Sen. Udall introduced resolutions to terminate the declaration of a national emergency with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019;S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019. Neither emergency had invoked IEEPA authorities.

365 Luong, “Forcing Constraint,” p. 1181.

366 National Security Powers Act of 2021, S. 2391 (Murphy), 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 20, 2021. For additional examples during the 116th Congress, see Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723 (Davidson), 116th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2019; Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899 (Kaine), 116th Cong., 1stsess., March 27, 2019.

367 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 9.

368 Since the enactment of the NEA, two resolutions to terminate a national emergency have been introduced. The first was to terminate the national emergency declared in response to Hurricane Katrina, but the declaration of emergency in that case did not invoke IEEPA. H.J.Res. 69 (Miller), 109th Congress, 1st session, September 8, 2005. The second was to terminate the national emergency declared February 15, 2019 with respect to the Southern Border of the United States. H.J.Res. 46 (Castro), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 22, 2019; S.J.Res. 10 (Udall), 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2019. However, neither of the declarations of national emergency at issue invoked IEEPA.

369 50 U.S.C. §1622(b).

370 E.g., Reforming Emergency Powers to Uphold the Balances and Limitations Inherent in the Constitution Act or the REPUBLIC Act, S. 463 (Paul), 117th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2021; Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised Over National Emergencies Act or the ARTICLE One Act, S. 764(Lee), 116th Cong., 1st sess., March 12, 2019, as reported to the Senate November 19, 2019.

371 Export Control Reform Act, P.L. 115-232, (August 13, 2018), Title XVII(B).

372 Ibid. §1766(a).

373 E.O. 13222.

374 Export Control Reform Act §1766(a). Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4611, 4612, 4613, were not repealed.

375 Ibid. §1766(b) (“The President shall implement [Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of the Export Administration Act of 1979] by exercising the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).”).