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国际经济紧急权力法(IEEPA)的演变

来源: | 作者:由飘洋过海翻译和整理 | 发布时间 :2022-08-20 | 1841 次浏览: | 分享到:
本文概述了《国际紧急经济权力法》自1977年通过以来的演变过程。该法取代了战时《与敌国贸易法》部分内容,限制总统在非国家紧急情况下行使经济紧急权力。随后数十年,总统频繁依据该法宣布国家紧急状态,使用范围也在不断扩大。最初用于制裁外国政府,后扩大到团体和个人;地域范围也从具体国家扩展到不限地域的威胁。国会有时在非紧急情况下指示总统使用该法权力,或追溯批准紧急使用。该法现主要用于管制交易和冻结资产,支持外交政策目标。冻结资产的处置对经济制裁效果具重要影响,总统和国会均曾决定其去向。

国际经济紧急权力法(IEEPA)的演变插图


本报告根据Congressional Research Service (CRS) 于2022年3月25日发布的《The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use》全文翻译


就与1977年修订前的TWEA一样,总统和国会经常利用IEEPA实施经济制裁以推进美国的外交政策和国家安全目标。IEEPA最初是为了限制总统的紧急权力而制定的,95但自该法规实施以来,总统对 IEEPA的紧急使用在规模、范围和频率上都有所扩大。众议院关于 IEEPA的报告中写道:“紧急事件本质上是罕见和短暂的,不能等同于正常的、正在发生的问题。” 96但是,自 IEEPA颁布以来,国家紧急事件的发生频率和持续时间都在增加。

 

从1977年到2022年3月25日,总统们在根据NEA宣布的67个新的国家紧急状态声明中援引了IEEPA。97平均而言,这些紧急状态持续了近9年。大多数紧急状态都是针对特定的国家或政府这种具有地理的属性。然而,自1990年以来,总统们宣布了非地理属性的紧急状态,以应对武器扩散、全球恐怖主义和恶意网络活动等问题。98伴随着地理属性的减弱,根据IEEPA的授权发布的制裁对象的属性也在扩大。最初,IEEPA被用来针对国家或政府;然而,总统们越来越多地针对团体和个人。99尽管总统通常将IEEPA作为一项紧急权力来使用,但国会也指示使用IEEPA或在一些法规中表示批准总统的对IEEPA的紧急使用。100

 

总统的紧急使用 101

 

当总统援引NEA来宣布国家进入紧急状态时,IEEPA是最经常引用的紧急权力。IEEPA并没有规定与TWEA相同的一套紧急权力,而是要求总统为每一次独立使用宣布国家进入紧急状态。因此,在过去的40年里,根据NEA的条款宣布的国家紧急状态的数量激增。在IEEPA实施之前的40年间,总统仅在TWEA的规定下宣布了4次国家紧急状态。相反,总统们在根据NEA发布的75个国家紧急状态声明中有67个援引了IEEPA。102截至2022年3月25日,有40个正在进行的国家紧急状态;除3个外,其余都与IEEPA有关。103

 

自1990年以来,总统每年都会发布大约4.5个引用IEEPA的行政命令,并宣布1.5个引用IEEPA的新的国家紧急状态(图1)。104

 

图1:援引 IEEPA的声明和行政命令

数据来源:Congressional Research Service (CRS)。 2020年代的数据截止到2022年3月25日。

注:行政命令包括以行政命令形式发布的援引IEEPA的国家紧急状态的声明,以及对紧急状态或此类命令的任何后续修改或修订。

 

平均而言,援引IEEPA的紧急状态持续了9年以上。105持续时间最长的紧急状态也是第一次宣布的。吉米ž卡特总统为应对1979年的伊朗人质危机,根据NEA的规定宣布了第一个国家紧急状态,并援引了IEEPA。106 40多年来,连续七位总统每年都延长这一紧急状态。截至2022年3月25日,该紧急状态仍然有效,主要是为解决与伊朗国王有争议资产的所有权问题提供法律依据。107除最初的紧急状态外,援引IEEPA的紧急状态的持续时间每十年都在增加。20世纪80年代宣布的援引IEEPA的紧急状态的平均时间是4年。20世纪90年代宣布的紧急状况的平均时间延长到11年,2000年代宣布的紧急状况的平均时间为13年(图2)。108

 

因此,自IEEPA和NEA颁布以来,正在进行的国家紧急状态的数量几乎持续增长(图3)。

 

图3:按年份统计的正在发生的国家紧急情况的累计数量

数据来源:Congressional Research Service (CRS)。 数据截止2022年3月25日。

 

从1979年1月1日到2022年3月25日,平均每年有14个正在进行的国家紧急状态,其中13个援引了IEEPA。

 

在大多数情况下,援引《紧急状态法》宣布的紧急状态都是有地域性的。例如,在第一次使用《紧急状态法》时,吉米ž卡特总统发布了一项行政命令,宣布针对 “伊朗局势”的国家紧急状态,并“查封伊朗政府的所有财产和财产利益[......]。” 109五个月后,卡特总统发布了第二项命令,极大地扩大了第一项行政命令的范围,有效阻止了受美国管辖的任何人向伊朗转移所有物项、金钱或信贷。110另一项命令扩大了覆盖范围,禁止从伊朗向美国进口商品。111这些命令加在一起,几乎触及了受美国管辖的任何地方或法人与伊朗领土和政府之间的所有经济联系。112

 

许多援引IEEPA的行政命令都遵循这种模式,将范围限制在一个特定的领土、政府或其国民。例如,第12513号行政命令禁止“原产于尼加拉瓜的物项和服务进口到美国”和“从美国出口到尼加拉瓜或以尼加拉瓜为目的地的物项”。该命令同样禁止尼加拉瓜航空公司和在尼加拉瓜注册的船只进入美国港口。113第12532号行政命令禁止与“南非政府或由该政府拥有或控制的实体”进行各种交易。114

 

虽然大多数援引IEEPA的国家紧急状态都有具体的地理范围,但最近的许多紧急状态都没有明确的地理范围限制。115乔治žHžWž布什总统针对化学和生物武器扩散造成的威胁,宣布了第一个没有具体地理范围的紧急状态。116同样,乔治žWž布什总统针对“实施、威胁实施或支持恐怖主义的人”造成的威胁宣布了国家紧急状态。117巴拉克ž奥巴马总统宣布紧急状态,以应对“跨国犯罪组织 ”和 “从事恶意网络活动的人”的威胁。118唐纳德ž特朗普总统宣布紧急状态,以应对“制造和利用信息和通信技术及服务中的漏洞”的 “外国敌手”。119这些命令没有明确的地理范围限制,包括了全球范围的规定。在过去的40年里,这些援引IEEPA的非特定地域的紧急状况越来越频繁。120

 

除了地理限制的削弱,宣布国家紧急状态的公开动机也在范围上有所扩大。最初,援引IEEPA宣布国家紧急状态的公开理由很短,而且往往提到特定的地理环境或政府的具体行动。总统们发现,像“伊朗局势”121或 “尼加拉瓜政府的政策和行动” 122这样的情况构成了对美国国家安全和外交政策的“不寻常和特殊的威胁”,因此将宣布国家紧急状态。123

 

然而,随着时间的推移,所公开的理由在长度和焦点方面都有所扩大。总统们越来越多地宣布国家紧急状态,部分原因是为了应对侵犯人权和公民权利的行为124、奴役125、剥夺宗教自由126、政治迫害127、公共腐败128、以及破坏民主进程的行为。129虽然第一次提到将侵犯人权作为宣布国家紧急状态的理由是在1985年130,但大多数此类提法是在过去20年里发生的(表A-2)。

 

总统们还扩大了IEEPA制裁对象的性质。最初,援引IEEPA发布的制裁目标是外国政府。如IEEPA的第一次援引是针对“伊朗政府财产”131之后 对IEEPA的援引迅速扩大到针对特定的地区。132并且,总统们也越来越多地针对团体,如政党、公司或恐怖组织,以及个人,如恐怖主义的支持者、可疑的毒品贩运者或被国际刑事法院指定的人。133

 

第一批针对团体或个人的命令仅限于外国团体或个人。例如,在第12978号行政命令中,比尔ž克林顿总统针对特定的“外国人”和“被确定为[......]由这些外国人拥有或控制,或为其或代表其行事的人”。134下文摘录如下:


除IEEPA第203(b)条{50 U.S.C. 1702(b)}和根据本命令可能发布的条例、命令、指令或许可证中规定的范围外,尽管在生效日期之前签订了任何合同或颁发了任何许可证或执照,我在此命令查封以下所有财产和财产利益,这些财产现在或将来会进入美国境内,或现在或将来会进入美国人的占有或控制范围:

(a) 本命令附件中所列的外国人士;

(b) 财政部长经与司法部长和国务卿协商后确定的外国人员:

(i)  在以哥伦比亚为中心的国际麻醉品贩运中发挥重要作用;或

(ii) 在实质上协助本命令所指定的人或根据本命令指定的人的麻醉品贩运活动,或为其提供财政或技术支助,或提供物项或服务;以及

(c) 财政部长经与司法部长和国务卿协商,确定由本命令中或根据本命令被指认的人拥有或控制,或为其行事或代表其行事的人。135

 

然而,2001年,乔治žWž布什总统发布了第13219号行政命令,针对“威胁西巴尔干地区的国际稳定的人”。虽然该命令与12978号行政命令相似,但它取消了“外国”这一限定词。因此,美国境内的人,包括美国公民,都可以成为该命令的目标。以下是该命令的摘录:

 

除IEEPA{50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(1), (3),和(4)}第203条(b)(1), (3),和(4),《2000年贸易制裁改革和加强出口法》(第9篇,P.L. 106-387)规定的范围外,以及此后可能根据本命令发布的法规、命令、指令或许可证的规定,尽管在生效日期之前签订了任何合同或已颁发了任何许可证或执照,136下列财产和财产利益:

(i) 本命令附件中所列的人;及

(ii) 财政部长与国务卿协商后指定的人员,原因是他们被认定为:

 

(A) 实施了暴力行为或已构成实施暴力行为的重大风险......。137

 

随后的几次援引IEEPA的行动也同样不限于外国目标。138

 

总之,总统对《紧急状态法》的使用最初是针对外国的,目标是按地理或国籍划分的。然而,自20世纪90年代以来,总统们扩大了其声明的范围,以包括从事特定活动的团体和个人,而不论其国籍或地理位置。

 

国会非紧急使用和追溯批准


虽然IEEPA通常被归类为紧急法律,但国会在国家紧急状况之外也使用过IEEPA。当国会立法制裁时,它往往授权或指示总统使用IEEPA的权力来实施这些制裁。

 

例如,在2018年《尼加拉瓜人权和反腐败法》中,国会指示总统“在必要范围内行使IEEPA授予总统的所有权力,以阻止和禁止‘某些交易’。” 139同样,对违反总统根据该法实施处罚措施的人也参照 IEEPA规定。140

 

这一趋势是长期的。国会于1986年首次指示总统利用IEEPA的授权,协助海地努力收回其前政府非法挪用的资产。该法规定:


总统应行使IEEPA[50 USC 1702]第203条授予的权力,协助海地政府努力通过法律程序收回海地政府声称被前终身总统让ž克劳德ž杜瓦利埃和其他与杜瓦利埃政权有关联的其他个人窃取的资产。本款应被视为满足IEEPA第202条的要求。[50 USC 1701] 141

 

在指示总统使用IEEPA时,国会放弃了总统必须先宣布国家进入紧急状态的要求(事实上也是没有宣布)。142

 

随后的立法也遵循了这一总体模式,只是在表述和具体规定上略有不同。143以下是最近几部法律中出现的现行立法语言的一个例子。

 

(a) 一般情况——总统应就下列事项实施(b)款所述的制裁:

     ……

(b) 所述制裁

(1) 一般。——本款所述制裁如下:

         

(A) 资产冻结。——行使IEEPA(美国法典第50编第1701节及其后)授予总统的所有权力,在必要范围内冻结和禁止被总统确定为受(a)款约束的人的所有财产和财产利益的所有交易,如果该等财产和财产利益在美国境内,来自美国,或者在美国人的占有或控制之下。

(B) 处罚。——违反、企图违反、共同违反或导致违反第(1)(A)款或为执行第(1)(A)款而颁布的任何法规、许可或命令的人,应受到IEEPA (美国法典第50编第1701节)第206条(b)和(c)款规定的处罚,其程度与犯下该条(a)款所述非法行为的人相同。144

 

国会还表示,在国家紧急状态下,将追溯性地批准总统单方面援引IEEPA。例如,在2017年《打击伊朗破坏稳定活动法》中,国会宣布:“国会认为,财政部长和国务卿应继续执行第13382号行政命令。” 145

 

然而,总统们也曾利用 IEEPA先发制人或修改并行的国会活动。在1985年9月9日,里根总统发现“南非政府的政策和行动对美国的外交政策和经济构成了异常和重大的威胁”,宣布全国进入紧急状态,并限制与南非的贸易往来。146尽管限制与南非交易的立法正在国会迅速通过,但总统还是通过声明宣布了这一紧急状态。147里根总统在关于该声明的讲话中提出,他一直反对国会考虑的法案,因为未附具体解释的条款“会伤害到美国试图帮助的人”。148然而,当时的新闻界人士149(以及此后的至少一位学者)150指出,行政命令所施加的限制和当时正在国会表决通过的法案内容“基本相似”。151

 

IEEPA在当前的作用

 

总的来说,IEEPA是战后国际制裁制度的一个组成部分。152总统通过宣布进入紧急状态或通过法定指示,利用IEEPA管制经济交易,以支持行政部门和国会的国家安全和外交政策目标。根据IEEPA采取的大部分行动涉及管制交易和冻结资产。

 

一旦总统宣布国家进入紧急状态,他可以使用IEEPA第203条(美国法典第50编第1702条授权)规定的权力,调查、管制或禁止外汇交易、信贷转让、证券转让、支付,并可以采取与外国或个人拥有利益的财产有关的特定行动——冻结资产,查封财产和财产利益,禁止美国人进行与所冻结的资产和查封的财产有关的交易,并在特定情况下拒绝进入美国。

 

根据该第203条规定,总统可以:

 

  • 禁止与被认定从事恶意网络活动(包括“干扰或破坏选举程序或机构”)的人员进行交易并冻结其财产[2015年4月1日第13694号行政命令及其修订版;美国法典第50篇第1701节注释。另参见2018年9月12日第  13848号行政命令;83 F. R.46843.];

  • 禁止与被认定为非法麻醉品贩运者(包括外国贩毒头目)进行交易并查封其财产;

  • 禁止与被认定为侵犯人权或严重腐败的人进行交易并查封其财产;

  • 禁止与未经加工钻石非法贸易有关的交易;

  • 禁止与被认定为跨国犯罪组织的主体进行交易并查封其财产;

  • 禁止与“破坏中东和平进程者”进行交易;

  • 禁止与他国进行有关飞越领空的交易;

  • 制定和维持海事限制;

  • 禁止与大规模杀伤性武器相关的交易,与《武器出口管制法》和1979年《出口管理法》153授权的出口管制相结合,进一步遏制特定国家(如伊朗、朝鲜)的武器计划;

  • 禁止与被指定为“实施、威胁实施恐怖主义或支持恐怖主义的人”进行交易;

  • 按在其当时的一般授权——在《出口管理法》失效时,维持双重用途出口管制体系;

  • 查封被认定为从事危害关键基础设施(包括选举程序或私人部门商业秘密)的网络活动的人的财产,并禁止与其进行交易;

  • 查封被认定为严重侵犯人权或从事腐败行为的人的财产,并禁止与其进行交易;

  • 查封特定国家以及被认定为从事构成特殊威胁活动的外国人的特定财产,并禁止与其进行交易;

  • 禁止与“对美国信息和通信技术或服务的设计、完整性、制造、生产、分销、安装、运营或维护构成破坏或颠覆风险”的人进行交易。

 

没有哪位总统使用IEEPA对来自特定国家的进口产品或进口到美国的一般产品征收关税。然而,鉴于IEEPA与TWEA的相似性,加上其相对频繁地用于禁止进口和出口,表明这种情况是有可能发生的。154此外,没有哪位总统使用IEEPA来颁布一项主要在国内生效的政策。然而,一些学者认为,全球经济的一体化意味着有可能允许使用 IEEPA 来针对主要在国内生效的命令。155

 

应对国家安全威胁而征收进口关税的IEEPA与第232条的关系


虽然总统有可能利用IEEPA对进口物项征收额外的关税,就像尼克松总统依据TWEA所做的那样,但没有总统这样做。相反,在所谓的紧急状态下,总统们却求助于《1962年贸易发展法》的第232条。156第232条规定,如果商务部长“发现某种物项进口到美国的数量等情况有可能损害国家安全”,那么总统可以采取行动以调整进口,使其不再损害国家安全。157虽然援引该法第232条款需要商务部长的调查结果,但NEA的限制和报告要求并不适用。由于这个原因,第232条可能是总统为国家安全目的征收额外关税的一个有吸引力的权力来源。利用这一权力,唐纳德žJž特朗普总统在2018年3月对钢铁和铝征收额外的关税。158然而,IEEPA不受第232条同样的程序限制的约束。由于不需要调查,IEEPA的权力可以在任何时候被援引,以应对基于“异常和重大的威胁,其全部或大部分来源是在美国境外”的国家紧急状态。因此,IEEPA可能是总统迅速征收关税的一个权力来源。2019年5月30日,特朗普总统宣布,他打算利用IEEPA对所有从墨西哥进口的商品征收并逐步提高5%的关税,直到“墨西哥采取有效行动缓解非法移民危机”。159该关税计划于2019年6月10日实施,并在随后的每个月初增加5%的关税。2019年6月7日,特朗普总统宣布,“美国原定6月10日对墨西哥实施的关税计划现无限期中止。” 160

 

根据IEEPA行使冻结资产的权力161

 

对依据IEEPA冻结的资产的最终处置作为经济制裁,将会影响外国行为者行为的一个重要部分。因此,为了促进外交政策的目标,总统和国会有时都会各自决定被冻结资产的最终处置。

 

总统根据IEEPA利用被冻结的外国资产

 

在外交政策危机期间,总统们将冻结资产作为一种讨价还价的工具,通过解冻资产、将其返还给受制裁的实体或将其转交给继任政府来解决上述危机。以下是总统们如何利用被冻结资产解决外交政策问题的一些例子。

 

为应对1979年的人质危机,卡特总统援引IEEPA的授权,对伊朗实施贸易制裁,冻结了伊朗在美国的资产。162在阿尔及利亚的斡旋下,美国和伊朗1981年1月19日,达成了一系列行政协议,根据这些协议,人质被释放,将冻结的资产分配给各个实体。163在被冻结的资产中,根据协议将51亿美元用于偿还伊朗向美国的银行未偿的借款,28亿美元返还伊朗,10亿美元转入海牙的一个安全账户,用于支付伊朗——美国索赔法庭(IUSCT)仲裁的美国对伊朗的其他索赔,剩下20亿美元仍被继续冻结,等待与伊朗达成进一步协议或法庭的裁决。美国还冻结了前国王的遗产和其近亲的资产,等待美国法院对伊朗诉美国政府返还财产权利的判决。伊朗的诉讼最终败诉,任何有争议的资产都没有返还伊朗。164

 

在美国继续承认被政变推翻或以其他方式取代的前政府为一国合法政府的情况下,总统们也曾将冻结的资产输送给反对派政府。例如,在巴拿马总统埃里克ž阿图罗ž德尔瓦勒试图解除事实上的军事统治者曼努埃尔ž诺列加将军的巴拿马国防军首脑职务,导致德尔瓦勒本人被巴拿马立法议会解职后,里根总统承认德尔瓦勒为合法政府首脑,并对诺列加政权实施经济制裁。165作为这些制裁的一部分,国务院于1988年2月建议美国的银行不要向诺列加政权支付资金,而德尔瓦勒获得了允许使用这些资金的法庭命令。166 1988年4月,里根总统发布了第12635号行政命令,“查封巴拿马政府在美国境内的所有财产和财产利益......或由位于美国境内的主体拥有或控制的财产”。167 1988年6月,财政部发布条例,将美国政府欠巴拿马的大部分款项和“因巴拿马运河委员会的运营而欠巴拿马的”所有款项,转入在纽约联邦储备银行设立的一个托管账户。168该托管账户中的资金用于支付德尔瓦莱政府的运营费用。169 1990年初,美国对巴拿马的入侵结束后,乔治žHžWž布什总统解除了对该国的经济制裁170,并使用部分被冻结的资金来偿还巴拿马欠外国债权人的债务,剩余的资金则交给了新一届政府。171

 

奥巴马政府和特朗普政府针对委内瑞拉的政治局势均采取了类似的行动。巴拉克ž奥巴马总统最初在2015年根据IEEPA和2014年《委内瑞拉人权和公民社会保护法》冻结了委内瑞拉政府资产。172 2019年1月,特朗普政府正式承认委内瑞拉反对派领导人胡安ž瓜伊多为委内瑞拉临时总统,173并允许瓜伊多获得“存放在美国联邦储备局和其他投保的美国金融机构”的冻结的委内瑞拉政府资产。174特朗普政府还根据IEEPA实施了额外的制裁,冻结了委内瑞拉国家石油公司Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa)的资产,175这大大减少了马杜罗政权的可用资金。176拜登政府继续承认瓜伊多的临时政府。177

 

将冻结的外国资产用于联合国安理会授权的目的也有先例。在第一次伊拉克战争后,乔治žHžWž布什总统下令将美国的银行持有的通过出售伊拉克石油获得的被冻结的伊拉克资产转移到纽约联邦储备银行的一个账户中,以履行“美国在联合国安理会第778号决议下的权利和义务”。178总统援引了《联合国参与法》(UNPA)179的一个章节以及IEEPA作为采取这一行动的授权。180总统下令将转移的资金用于提供人道主义救济和资助联合国赔偿委员会,181该委员会是为裁决因伊拉克侵略而对伊拉克提出的索赔而成立的。182其他伊拉克资产仍被冻结并积累利息,直到美国在2003年根据IEEPA将其没收。183

 

在某些情况下,美国已经结束了制裁,并将冻结的资产归还给继任政府。例如,作为解除制裁的一个条件,美国在2003年将属于南斯拉夫社会主义联邦共和国中央银行的2.376亿美元冻结资金归还继任政府的中央银行。184 2002年,美国将原属于塔利班的2.17亿美元冻结资金释放给阿富汗临时政府。185

 

截至本报告发布之日,美国手上的阿富汗中央银行(DaB)资产的归属在2021年塔利班接管阿富汗时仍悬而未决。2001年9月11日被恐怖袭击的受害者——包括幸存者和其家属,在诉塔利班的判决中获得了有关这些资产的扣押令。186拜登政府随后根据IEEPA 187查封了这些资金,并提交了一份利益声明188,要求法院允许根据代表阿富汗人民签发的OFAC许可证189划转一半(35亿美元)的资产给他们,以“解决重大的人道主义和经济问题,并避免进一步的地区动荡和其他违背美国外交政策利益的情况。” 190而另一半资产将继续被查封,以使判决原告提出有权扣押这些资产以履行判决的机会。在利益声明中,政府没有就原告对这些资产的权利采取任何立场,但提出了一些似乎不利于判决原告的法律考虑。191

 

国会强制使用已冻结的外国资产和制裁收益

 

行政部门历来是抵制国会力推在未与有关国家达成和解协议的前提下将外国资产没收并用于偿付美国索赔者,192但对于被指定为 “恐怖主义国家支持者”的外国政府,国会已经克服了这种阻力。193自1996年以来,作为涉及遭受在指定国家支持下的恐怖主义伤害的美国国民,可以根据《外国主权豁免法》(FSIA)的例外规定起诉这些国家并要求赔偿。194

 

为了便于执行依据上述例外规定做出的判决,国会于1999年通过了《财政和政府拨款法》195第117条,该条对FSIA做了进一步修订,允许对TWEA第5条(b)款、《对外援助法》第620条(a)款(授权对古巴的贸易禁运)或IEEPA第202和203条,或根据这些法律发布的任何命令、许可或其他授权禁止或管制的国家财产进行扣押和执行。然而,由于克林顿政府的持续反对,因此第117条同时授予了总统“为了国家安全的利益而放弃本条的要求”的权力,克林顿总统迅速签署通过了该法案。196

 

此后,第117条的豁免权继续有效,保护了被查封的外国政府资产不被扣押,以保证履行对恐怖主义的判决,这促使国会采取其他行动,将冻结的资产提供给胜诉方。国会颁布了《2000年贩运和暴力受害者保护法》(VTVPA)197第2002条,规定从被冻结的古巴资产中支付2000年7月20日或之前根据《外国投资法》恐怖主义例外规定古巴须做出的补偿性赔偿。

 

财政部随后从美国和古巴之间长途电话服务基金中拨款9670万美元,用于赔偿Alejandra诉古巴共和国一案的索赔人,该诉讼是基于1996年两架未携带武器的美国民用飞机被古巴空军击落的事件,198另一笔超过700万美元的款项是利用没收的古巴资产支付给一名佛罗里达妇女,她因与一名古巴间谍的婚姻而打赢了一场针对古巴的诉讼。199

 

由于针对被指定的恐怖主义国家支持者的未支付判决不断增加,国会颁布了《恐怖主义风险保险法》(TRIA)。200 TRIA第201条推翻了行政部门长期以来的反对意见,将冻结的恐怖主义国家资产可用于满足被这些国家(以及组织和个人)损害的赔偿性判决,具体内容如下:

尽管法律有其他规定,除(b)款的规定外,因基于向恐怖主义行为的索赔而获得不利于恐怖分子一方的判决,或恐怖分子一方根据美国法典第28篇第1605A条或1605(a)(7)款(该条在2008年1月27日生效)不享有豁免权的,被查封的恐怖分子一方资产(包括被查封的该恐怖分子一方的任何机构或部门的资产)应被执行或扣押以协助执行,以便在该恐怖分子一方在被裁定负有责任的任何补偿性损害赔偿范围内履行该判决。201

 

第201条(b)款规定了“出于国家安全利益”的豁免权,但只适用于“受《维也纳外交关系公约》或《维也纳领事关系公约》约束的”被冻结的外国政府财产。当国会在2008年202修订《外国投资法》以修正针对恐怖主义的例外情况时,它规定根据新的例外情况做出的判决可以外国的财产清偿,尽管事实上有关财产是被美国政府根据TWEA或IEEPA监管的。203国会有时也会制定立法,使特定的资产可用于清偿特定的判决。204


国会还指示将某些违反制裁的收益支付存入一个基金,用于向伊朗的前人质和对恐怖主义国家胜诉判决的债权人提供赔偿。205为了给该计划提供资金,国会指定将美国没收的伊朗拥有的某些不动产、银行账户和10.25亿美元捐赠给美国国家支持的恐怖主义受害者基金,该基金是根据2014年6月27日美国与法国巴黎银行就违反制裁达成的诉辩交易及和解协议支付而给美国的款项。206该基金通过对违反IEEPA或基于TWEA的法规,或任何相关的民事或刑事共谋、计划,或其他代表国家支持恐怖主义的商业活动有关的联邦罪行进行刑事处罚和没收来补充。207所有与相同罪行有关的民事处罚和没收的四分之三也存入该基金。208该基金将于2039年到期。


俄罗斯2022年对乌克兰的大举入侵,导致行政部门在因其他原因实施的制裁之外,又对俄罗斯实施新的制裁。209一些国会议员已经提出立法,寻求扣押和重新利用俄罗斯的冻结资产,以利于乌克兰。210对于其中一些提案如允许扣押与美国有重要联系的资产或在美国境内的资产如果颁布,可能会招致基于第五修正案 “没收”和正当程序条款的法律挑战。211


______________________________________

Note:

95 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 2-9.

96 Ibid, p. 11.

97 This tally does not include IEEPA invocations made in connection with executive orders expanding the scope of an initial declaration of national emergency. See Table A-1.

98 E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1, 2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11, 2020).

99 See “Presidential Emergency Use.”

100 See “Congressional Nonemergency Use and Retroactive Approval.”

101 The numbers here define emergencies by executive orders declaring an emergency. This choice causes some anomalies in the data. For example, the national emergency with regard to controlling the whereabouts of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons in Russia lapsed when the notice extending the emergency was not published in the Federal Register by the emergency’s anniversary date on June 21, 2012. As such, President Barack Obama issued an executive order declaring a new national emergency to reinstate the restrictions. For consistency, such anomalies have been treated as two distinct national emergencies. Such treatment decreases the average duration of emergencies. See, e.g., E.O. 13159, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 21, 2000); E.O. 13617, Blocking Property of the Government of the Russian Federation Relating to the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons (June 25, 2012).

102 The eight declarations of emergency under the NEA that did not involve IEEPA as of March 25, 2022 were all made by presidential proclamation. See Proclamation 6491, To Suspend the Davis-Bacon Act of March 3, 1931, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (October 14, 1992); Proclamation 6867, Declaration of a National Emergency and Invocation of Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation of the Anchorage and Movement of Vessels around Cuba (March 1, 1996); Proclamation 6907, Declaration of a State of Emergency and Release of Feed Grain From the Disaster Reserve (July 1, 1996); Proclamation 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks (September 14, 2001); Proclamation 7924, To Suspend Subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40, United States Code, Within a Limited Geographic Area in Response to the National Emergency Caused by Hurricane Katrina (September 8, 2005); Proclamation 8443, Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic (October 23, 2009); Proclamation 9844, Declaration of a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States (February 15, 2019); Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak (March 13, 2020).

103 The three ongoing emergencies not involving IEEPA as of March 25, 2022 were declared in: Proclamation 6867, Proclamation 7463, Proclamation 9994. The first two of these national emergencies were declared in response to foreign threats. Notably, while IEEPA was not invoked in the first declaration of national emergency following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush declared a second state of emergency invoking IEEPA. E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transaction with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001).

104 The practice of issuing IEEPA-related executive orders has also changed over time. During the Iran hostage-taking in 1979, for example, President Carter issued a new and separate E.O. with each fine-tuning of the initial national emergency declaration; overall from November 1979 to his last day in office in January 1981, President Carter issued 12 executive orders relating to the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran. Later presidents have opted, instead, to issue one executive order to declare the existence of a national emergency, and then to revisit that order to adjust or expand its reach by amending the original language.

105 Emergencies invoking IEEPA that have been terminated lasted an average of 6.5 years. However, most emergencies citing IEEPA have not been terminated, including the first ever declared, which has been ongoing since 1979.

106 E.O. 12170, Blocking Iranian Government Property (November 14, 1979).

107 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Iran, 86 Federal Register 62,709 (November 10, 2021).

108 Not enough time has passed to understand whether the trend will continue with those national emergencies declared in the 2010s.

109 E.O. 12170.

110 E.O. 12205, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 7, 1980). The order exempted “food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering.”

111 E.O. 12211, Economic Sanctions Against Iran (April 17, 1980).

112 Exceptions were made for family remittances.

113 E.O. 12513, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua (May 1, 1985).

114 E.O. 12532, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa (September 9, 1985).

115 This number excludes those emergencies declared to extend the Export Administration Act of 1979.

116 E.O. 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (November 16, 1990).

117 E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001).

118 E.O. 13581, Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011); E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015).

119 E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 14, 2019).

120 See, E.g., E.O. 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (April 1, 2015); E.O. 13818, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption (December 20, 2017); E.O. 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election (September 12, 2018); E.O. 13873, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (May 15, 2019); E.O. 13920, Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (May 1, 2020); E.O. 13928, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court (June 11, 2020). Some have argued that this shift was the result of humanitarian concerns about the effects of sanctions on the populations of the targeted states. Beginning in the 1990s, United Nations Security Council sanctions began to target the political and economic elites of a state, rather than the whole population. Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. xi. However, use of such orders has expanded beyond political and economic elites. See, e.g., E.O. 13928.

121 E.O. 12170.

122 E.O. 12513.

123 Ibid.

124 E.O. 12532; E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Cote d'Ivoire (February 7, 2006); E.O. 13067, Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan (November 3, 1997); E.O. 13692, Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela (March 8, 2015).

125 E.O. 13067.

126 E.O. 13067.

127 E.O. 13405, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus (June 16, 2006).

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid.

130 E.O. 12532.

131 E.O. 12170.

132 See, e.g., E.O. 12513.

133 See, e.g., E.O. 12865 (prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the second largest political party in Angola); E.O. 13129 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban); E.O. 13224 (prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism); E.O. 12978 (prohibiting transactions with certain narcotics traffickers); E.O. 13928 (blocking property of certain persons associated with the International Criminal Court). See also CRS Insight IN11428, International Criminal Court: U.S. Sanctions in Response to Investigation of War Crimes in Afghanistan, by Matthew C. Weed and Dianne E. Rennack.

134 E.O. 12978, Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions With Significant Narcotics Traffickers (October 21,

1995).

135 Ibid. Emphasis added.

136 See, e.g., Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, , 2003 WL 22143735, at *3 (D. Minn. August 21, 2003).

137 E.O. 13219, Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans(June 26, 2001). Emphasis added.

138 See, e.g., E.O. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism (September 23, 2001); E.O. 13396, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (February 7, 2006).

139 P.L. 115-335 (December 20, 2018), 132 Stat. 5019.

140 Ibid.

141 P.L. 99-529 (October 24, 1986), 100 Stat. 3010.

142 Ibid.

143 See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, P.L. 102-484 (October 23, 1992), 106 Stat. 2315; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, P.L. 104-1172 (August 5, 1996), 110 Stat. 1541; Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261 (October 17, 1998) 112 Stat. 1920; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, P.L. 106-386 (October 28, 2000), 114 Stat. 1464; Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, P.L. 108-497 (December 23, 2004), 118 Stat. 4012; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, P.L. 109-344 (October 13, 2006), 120 Stat. 1869; Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, P.L. 111-195 (July 1, 2010) 124 Stat 1312; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011, 125 Stat 1298; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, P.L. 112-158 (August 10, 2012) 126 Stat 1214 (makes some of the most extensive use of IEEPA); Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, P.L. 112-208(December 14, 2012) 126 Stat 1496; Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 113-291 (December 19, 2014), 128 Stat. 3293; Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018, P.L. 115-272 (October 25, 2018) 132 Stat. 4144.

144 Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, P.L. 113-95(April 3, 2014) 128 Stat. 1088. Identical language can be found, for example, in: The Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, P.L. 113-278 (December 18, 2014) 128 Stat. 3011; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016) 130 Stat. 2000. Similar language can be found, for example, in: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-122 (February 18, 2016) 130 Stat. 93; the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) 130 Stat 886. Depending on the circumstance, Congress also includes a clause waiving the requirement to declare a national emergency. See, e.g., P.L. 115-44; P.L. 115-272 (“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions [ ... ].”).

145 Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, P.L. 115-44 (August 2, 2017) §104 (22 U.S.C. 9403); E.O. 13382 of June 28, 2005, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” 70 Federal Register 38,567 (July 1, 2005).

146 E.O. 12532.

147 99 H.R. 1460; See also P.L. 99-440 (October 2, 1986).

148 Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer-Session with Reporters on Signing E.O. 12532, September 9, 1985, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1048, 1050.

149 See, e.g., questions by Helen Thomas, United Press International, Ibid, 1050.

150 Carter, International Economic Sanctions, p. 201.

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid., ch. 9.

153 Legislation to replace the Export Administration Act was passed as part of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232 (August 13, 2018), as the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Title XVII(B).

154 President Nixon, in effect, used TWEA to place a 10% ad valorem tariff on all imports to the U.S. Pres. Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971; United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975); See also Jason Luong, “Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” Texas Law Review 78 (2000), p. 1190.

155 “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” p. 1111; Patrick A. Thronson, “Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 46, no. 2 (2013), pp. 757-758.

156 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, §232(b)–(c), 76 Stat. 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §1862(b)–(c)).

157 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones; CRS Report R44707, Presidential Authority over Trade: Imposing Tariffs and Duties, by Caitlain Devereaux Lewis.

158 Procl. 9704, 83 Federal Register 11,619 (March 15, 2019); Procl. 9705, 83 Federal Register 13,361 (March 15, 2019). CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones.

159 Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis, May 30, 2019, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measuresaddress-border-crisis/.

160 President Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, June 7, 2018, 5:31 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/.1137155056044826626. The suspension preceded the release of a U.S. Mexico Joint Declaration on migration. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, June 7, 2019, available at https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/.

161 This section was authored by Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (ALD), CRS.

162 E.O. 12170, 44 Federal Register 65,729 (November 14, 1979).

163 The Algiers Accords comprise the following five documents: The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep’t St. Bull., No. 2047 1, 1 (1981) [hereinafter “General Declaration”], reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; The Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 19, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 3, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 19 January 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 4, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; Escrow Agreement Among the United States, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank Markazi Iran, and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and Technical Arrangement Between Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 20, 1981, 81 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20 (hereinafter “Algiers Accords”).

164 Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 677, 704 (October 2000) (explaining that “[a]ll of Iran’s lawsuits in U.S. courts [to recover the Shah’s assets] were eventually dismissed, principally on grounds of forum non conveniens”).

165 GAO Review of Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Panama, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-44, 4-5 (July 26, 1989).

166 Ibid., p. 5.

167 E.O. 12635, 53 Federal Register 12,134 (April 8, 1988).

168 GAO Report, supra note 159, at 5.

169 Ibid., p. 7.

170 E.O. 12,710, 55 Federal Register 13,099 (April 5, 1990).

171 See 1989 Cong. Q. Almanac 607 (reporting that the Department of the Treasury had concluded “that the net amount still due Panama, after ‘offsets, was about $200 million”).

172 E.O. 13692, 80 Federal Register 12,747 (March 8, 2015). For information about current sanctions against Venezuela, see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Clare Ribando Seelke.

173 President Donald J. Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts to Restore Democracy in Their Country, White House Fact Sheet January 29, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumpsupports-enezuelan-peoples-efforts-restore-democracy-country/. For background of the situation in Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.

174 Trump Supports the Venezuelan People’s Efforts.

175 E.O. 13857, 84 Federal Register 509 (January 25, 2019); Treasury Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil Company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., U.S. Department of the Treasury (January 28, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm594.

176 Marianna Parraga, “Venezuela’s oil exports sink to 17-year low, choked by U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports/venezuelas-oil-exports-sink-to-17-year-low-choked-by-ussanctions-idUSKBN2392SG.

177 Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Recognition of Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly and Interim President Guaidó (January 4, 2022), https://www.state.gov/u-s-recognition-of-venezuelas-2015-national-assembly-andinterim-president-guaido/.

178 E.O. 12817, 3 C.F.R. §317 (1992). President George H.W. Bush froze Iraqi assets under U.S. jurisdiction pursuant to IEEPA in response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. E.O. 12,722, 55 Federal Register 31,803 (August 2, 1990).

179 22 U.S.C. §287c (2018). The provision authorizes the President to give effect to U.N. Security Council resolutions by “investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing], in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The provision does not explicitly mention asset confiscation.

180 E.O. 12817, 57 Federal Register 48,433 (October 23, 1992).

181 See Ronald J. Bettauer, “Establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government Perspective,” The United Nations Compensation Commission (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 35.

182 S.C. Res. 687, para. 16 (April 8, 1991) (reaffirming that “Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, ... or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait”; S.C. Res. 692 (May 20, 1991) (establishing the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) to administer a system to provide compensation for claims for which Iraq is liable under paragraph 16 of S.C. Res. 687); S.C. Res. 706 and 712 (1991) (establishing an escrow account administered by the U.N. Secretary General to fund the costs of the UNCC and other activities); S.C. Res. 778 (1992) (directing all States in possession of funds due to Iraq for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to transfer those funds to the U.N. escrow account).

183 See “USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to IEEPA.”

184 Foreign Regimes’ Assets, GAO-04-1006, 11 (September 2004).

185 Ibid. at 12.

186 Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848 (S.D.N.Y. September 13, 2021).

187 E.O. 14064, 87 Federal Register 8391 (February 15, 2022).

188 United States Government Statement of Interest, Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 3-cv-09848, ECF 563 (S.D.N.Y. February 11, 2022) (hereinafter SOI).

189 OFAC License No. DABRESERVES-EO-2022-886895-1, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21226931/ex-bofac-license.pdf.

190 Ibid. SOI.

191 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss.

192 See, generally, 22 U.S.C. §§1621-1645o (Settlement of International Claims).

193 Current states designated as sponsors of terrorism are Iran (1984), Cuba (2021), North Korea (2017) and Syria (1979). See U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.

194 The so-called terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was originally codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7), but an amended version is now codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605A (2018). See CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea.

195 P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, §117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998), codified at 28 U.S.C. §1610(f)(1)(A) (2018).

196 Presidential Determination 99-1 (October 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2088 (October 26, 1998).

197 P.L. 106-386, §2002, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). Section 2002(b)(1) required the President to “vest and liquidate up to and not exceeding the amount of property of the Government of Cuba and sanctioned entities in the United States or any commonwealth, territory, or possession thereof that has been blocked pursuant to [TWEA or IEEPA]” to pay the compensatory damages portion of such judgments. Judgments against Iran were paid from appropriated funds.

198 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and $137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996). The payment represented compensatory damages, judicially imposed sanctions, and interest.

199 Martinez v. Republic of Cuba, No. 13-1999-CA 018208 (Miami-Dade Co., Fla., Cir. Ct. 2001) (awarding $7.1

million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages).

200 P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1610 note.

201 Ibid. The term “blocked asset” is defined in §201(d) of TRIA to mean (A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under [TWEA or IEEPA]; and (B) does not include property that— (i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by statute other than [IEEPA] or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or (ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the law of the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes.

202 P.L. 110-181 §1083 (2008) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).

203 28 U.S.C. §1610(g) (2018). It is unclear whether “regulated” property and “blocked asset” are meant to be synonymous.

204 P.L. 112-158, Title V, §502, 126 Stat. 1258 (2012); P.L. 116-92, div. A, Title XII, §1226, 133 Stat. 1645 (2019), both codified at 22 USC §8772. The Supreme Court upheld this approach in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310(2016). For an explanation of the case, see CRS Report R44967, Congress’s Power over Courts: Jurisdiction Stripping and the Rule of Klein, coordinated by Kevin M. Lewis.

205 See the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, , div. O, title IV (2015), 129 Stat. 3007,codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §20144 (2020).

206 Ibid., for more information about the program and funding for it, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United

States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea.

207 34 U.S.C. §20144(e) (2021).

208 Ibid.

209 See CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt; CRS Insight IN11869, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of U.S. and International Sanctions and Other Responses, by Cory Welt; CRS In Focus IF12062, New Financial and Trade Sanctions Against Russia, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson.

210 See, e.g., H.R. 7083; H.R. 7086; H.R. 3838; H.R. 7015; H.R. 6930; H.R. 6869; S. 3723; S. 3838.

211 See sections below “Fifth Amendment “Takings” Clause” and “Fifth Amendment “Due Process” Clause”.

 

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