国际紧急经济权力法(IEEPA)的起源

本报告根据Congressional Research Service (CRS) 于2022年3月25日发布的《The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use》 全文翻译

第一次世界大战和《对敌贸易法》（TWEA）

第一次世界大战（1914-1919年）期间，经济动员的程度是空前的。¹²无论是否得到立法机构的支持，欧洲政府的行政部门都开始调控其经济。相比之下，美国相对于它在欧洲的盟友来说，处于一种特殊的地位。美国与德国和奥匈帝国隔海相望，从未受到过实质性的入侵威胁。威尔逊总统没有依靠总统的固有权力，也没有采取违宪行动并希望随后得到国会的批准，而是寻求明确的预先授权，以获得广泛的新权力来应对全球危机。¹³从1916年到1917年底，国会通过了22项法律，授权总统在战争期间控制私人财产供公共使用。¹⁴这些法律赋予总统广泛的权力来控制铁路、造船厂、汽车、电报和电话系统、供水系统以及美国经济的许多其他部门。¹⁵

TWEA是这22项法律中的一条。¹⁶它赋予行政部门对国际贸易、投资、移民和美国与其敌人之间的通信进行某种程度的控制。¹⁷TWEA对“敌人”的定义很宽泛，包括“任何国籍的个人、合伙企业或其他个人团体（包括公司），居住在与美国交战的任何国家的领土内，或居住在美国境外但在该领土内做生意....。”¹⁸该法律的前四条授予总统广泛的权力，以限制与美国的敌人（或其盟友）的贸易、通信或运输。¹⁹这些条款还授权总统审查外国通信，并对敌方的保险或再保险公司施加广泛的限制。²⁰

然而，正是TWEA的第5条（b）款条构成了20世纪总统紧急经济权力的核心基础之一。最初颁布的第5条（b）款规定：

总统可以根据他制定的规则和条例，通过许可证或其他方式，调查、规范或禁止任何外汇交易、金币、银币或金条或货币的出口或指定用途、任何形式的信贷转让（仅与完全在美国境内执行的交易有关的信贷除外），美国境内任何人在美国与任何外国（不论是敌国、敌国的盟国或其他国家）之间，或在一个或多个外国居民之间转让债务证明或财产所有权，他可以要求参与任何此类交易的人在宣誓后提供与此有关的完整信息，包括在此类交易完成之前或之后出示由其保管或控制的与此有关的任何账簿、合同、信函或其他文件。²¹

该条款赋予总统在战时对私人国际经济交易的广泛控制权。²²虽然国会在1921年终止了许多战争权力，但该条款被特别豁免，因为美国政府还没有处理其保管的大量外国财产。²³

TWEA适用范围的扩大

大萧条是始于1929年的大规模全球经济衰退，给欧洲和美洲的很多国家带来了挑战。为了应对危机带来的复杂性，几乎所有这些国家都开始向其行政部门下放自由裁量权，其程度是以前只有在战争时期才有的。²⁴美国国会的部分回应是大幅扩大TWEA的适用范围，授予总统在和平时期宣布紧急状态的权力，并承担广泛的国内经济管理权力。

将经济危机类比为战争，使这种授权在政治上成为可能。富兰克林žDž罗斯福总统在公开演讲中宣称，大萧条须被“伟大的人民军队”“攻击”、“对抗”、“动员”和“打击”。²⁵第一次世界大战的经济总动员已经模糊了行政部门的军事和经济权力之间的界限。由于大萧条被比喻为“武装冲突”，²⁶并被最高法院的一位法官宣布为“比战争更严重的紧急状态”，²⁷因此，利用战时颁布的紧急经济立法作为和平时期特殊经济权力的基础成为惯例。²⁸

当大萧条进入第三年时，新当选的罗斯福总统要求国会“授予广泛的行政权力以便对紧急状况发动战争，授予其权力范围须不小于在我们国家事实上被外国敌人入侵时授予的权力”。²⁹ 在罗斯福作为总统的首次行动中，宣布了银行放假的命令，即暂停位于美国及其领土上的所有银行机构的所有交易四天。³⁰在他的命令公告中，罗斯福声称有权根据TWEA第5条（b）款宣布这一假期。³¹然而，由于美国没有处于战争状态，而且暂停的交易主要是国内交易，总统发布这种命令的权力受到了质疑。³²

尽管合法性脆弱，但国会在罗斯福宣布上述命令后三天就通过了《紧急银行救济法》，即批准了他的行动。³³该法案对TWEA第5条（b）款进行了修订，内容如下：

在战争期间或总统宣布的任何其他国家紧急状态期间，总统可以通过他可能指定的任何机构或其他方式，调查、规范或禁止....。³⁴

这项修订赋予总统权力，宣布存在国家紧急状态，并对国民经济进行广泛的控制，以前只有在战争时期才有这种权力。到1934年，罗斯福利用这些广泛的新权力来监管“美国境内任何银行机构与美国境外任何银行机构之间的所有外汇交易和信贷转移”。³⁵

随着美国在1941年加入第二次世界大战，国会再次修订TWEA，授予总统处置私人财产的广泛权力，增加了所谓的 “剥夺”权力，授权永久没收财产。³⁶现在，TWEA以其最广泛的形式授权总统宣布全国进入紧急状态，并在此过程中对外汇、国内银行业务、贵金属的占有和任何外国或外国人拥有利益的财产进行管制。³⁷

第二次世界大战于1945年结束。冲突结束后，盟国建立了制度并签署了旨在维持和平和实现世界贸易自由化的协议。然而，美国并没有立即恢复和平时期对紧急权力的态度。相反，冷战的爆发使美国在宣战的背景下继续使用TWEA和其他紧急权力变得合理。³⁸在接下来的几十年里，总统们宣布了四次国家紧急状态，并对战后的经济交易行使了广泛的权力。³⁹

在冷战期间，经济制裁成为一个越来越受欢迎的外交政策和国家安全工具，而TWEA是总统使用这一工具的一个重要来源。

1950年，哈里ž杜鲁门总统援引TWEA，宣布国家进入紧急状态，对朝鲜和中国实施经济制裁。⁴⁰随后的几任总统都援引该国家紧急状态作为对越南、古巴和柬埔寨实施制裁的依据⁴¹杜鲁门同样利用TWEA第5条（b）款款来维持自20世纪30年代初开始实施的关于外汇、信贷转移以及硬币和货币出口的监管。⁴²理查德žMž尼克松总统和杰拉尔德žRž福特总统在《出口管理法》失效后援引TWEA继续实施该法规定的出口管制措施。⁴³

TWEA也是战后总统货币政策的一个重要工具。德怀特ž艾森豪威尔总统和约翰ž肯尼迪总统利用TWEA和罗斯福总统在1933年宣布的国家紧急状态来维持和修改控制黄金囤积和出口的法规。⁴⁴ 1968年，林登žBž约翰逊总统明确使用杜鲁门在1950年根据TWEA第5条（b）款宣布的紧急状态声明来限制美国公司的对外国直接投资，以在英国贬值英镑后改善美国的国际收支状况。⁴⁵ 1971年，在尼克松总统终止美元对黄金的挂钩后，他利用TWEA第5条（b）款宣布进入紧急状态，并对所有出口到美国的应税物项征收10%的从价附加税。⁴⁶

行政部门对TWEA第5条（b）款所赋予的权力的依赖，意味着战后的制裁制度和美国国际货币政策的很大一部分依赖于持续的紧急状态来实施。

国会为限制行政紧急权力所做的努力

到20世纪70年代中期，在美国军事介入越南、国内间谍活动、暗杀外国政治领导人、水门事件以及其他相关的滥用权力事件曝光之后，国会越来越重视对行政部门的制衡。参议院成立了一个由参议员弗兰克ž丘奇和查尔斯ž马蒂亚斯主持的两党特别委员会，以重新评估授予总统的紧急权力授权。⁴⁷特别委员会发布了一份调查总统紧急权力的报告，其中声称美国在技术上“自1933年3月9日以来一直处于国家紧急状态”，并且有四份不同的国家紧急状态声明正在生效。⁴⁸该报告还指出，美国“至少有470项没有时间限制的重要紧急状态法规，将通常由立法机构行使的广泛的自由裁量权授予行政部门，这些法规以一系列全面的方式影响着美国公民的日常生活。”⁴⁹

在委员会的调查过程中，委员会联合主席马蒂亚斯参议员指出：“美国大多数人一生都生活在紧急状态之下。”另一位联合主席丘奇参议员说，委员会面临的核心问题是，“在持续的紧急状态下，像我们这样的民主政府，在现行宪法和三权分立、权力均等的体制下，是否有可能存在下去。”⁵⁰

该委员会所强调的争议较大的法律包括TWEA。1977年，在众议院对修订TWEA的法律进行审议期间，众议院国际关系委员会经济政策小组委员会主席、众议员乔纳森ž宾厄姆（Jonathan Bingham）将TWEA描述为“总统可以不受国会约束地使用的独裁权力”。⁵¹根据司法部的说法，TWEA在战争或其他国家紧急状态时授予总统四大类权力：

(a)    对外汇、银行转账、硬币、金银、货币和证券的监管权；

(b)   对“任何外国或其国民拥有任何权益的任何财产”的监管权力；

(c)    没收“任何外国或其国民的任何财产或权益”的权力；以及

(d)   持有、使用、管理、清算、出售或以其他方式处理“此等权益或财产”的权力。⁵²

众议院关于改革立法的报告称TWEA“实质上是授予总统在国内和国际经济领域行使广泛权力的不受国会审查的无限制授权。”⁵³对TWEA的批评主要集中在以下几点:

(a)  它不要求就权力的使用或国家紧急状态的宣布与国会进行磋商或向国会提交报告。

(b) 它没有对紧急状态设定时间限制，没有国会审查机制，也没有国会终止紧急状态的办法。

(c)  它没有对TWEA的经济权力范围和可以使用该等权力的情形作出任何限制。

(d) 在国家紧急状态下采取的行动很少与宣布国家进入紧急状态的情况有关。⁵⁴

在众议院国际关系委员会的听证会上，著名法律学者哈罗德·麦尔教授总结了TWEA的发展和主要批评意见:

第5条（b）款的影响不再局限于现有迫在眉睫的危险意义上的“紧急状态”。国会对其所赋予的权力范围的广泛行政解释的继续追溯批准，或明或暗，已使该款成为了对总统授予的一般立法权……⁵⁵

国家紧急状态法和国际紧急经济权力法的颁布

根据TWEA，国会对紧急权力的改革包括两项法案。首先，国会于1976年颁布了NEA。⁵⁶该法案规定在1978年终止所有现有的紧急状态，但使用TWEA第5条(b)款宣布紧急状态除外，并对宣布新的紧急状态的方式和持续时间设置了新的限制，包括：

Ÿ   要求总统立即向国会递交宣布国家进入紧急状态的通知；

Ÿ   要求每半年进行一次审查，据此，“国会两院都应开会考虑就一项共同[现为联合，见下文]决议进行表决，以决定是否应终止该紧急状态。”；

Ÿ   授权国会通过一项特殊的共同[现为联合]决议终止国家紧急状态。⁵⁷

其次，国会处理了更为复杂的TWEA问题。由于TWEA授予的权力与战后的国际货币政策和美国外交政策中使用的制裁密切相关，因此解除该法是一项艰难的工作。⁵⁸对第5条(b)款的排除反映了国会对保留有关外国资产、外国资金和战略物资出口的现有管制的兴趣。⁵⁹同样，制定一个继续援引 TWEA 的手段反映了国会对“改善未来的使用而不是补救过去的滥用”的兴趣。⁶⁰

负责改革TWEA的小组委员会花了一年多的时间准备报告，包括TWEA的第一部完整的立法历史，这部巨著长达近700页。⁶¹在随后的立法中，国会做了三件事。首先，国会修改了TWEA，使其按照最初的意图，只在“战争期间”适用。⁶²第二，国会扩大了《出口管理法》的范围，包括以前参照TWEA第5条(b)款授予的权力。⁶³最后，国会制定了IEEPA，授予“总统在国家紧急状态下使用的一套新的权力，该等权力在范围上比第5条(b)款中的权力更为有限，并且受限于程序限制，包括NEA规定的程序。”⁶⁴

众议院国际关系委员会的报告在其对国际紧急经济权力的“新做法”中概括了“紧急状态”的性质：

鉴于权力的广泛性，以及总统在宣布国家紧急状态时可酌情使用这些权力，其行使应受到各种实质性限制。主要的限制来自于这样一种认识，即紧急状态在本质上是罕见和短暂的，不应等同于正常的问题。只有在构成真正的紧急状态的特定情况下，才应宣布国家进入紧急状态，才能使用紧急权力，而不应出于其他目的。当实际的紧急状态结束时，应及时终止紧急状态，而不是继续有效地用于其他情况。国家紧急状态不应成为一种正常状态。⁶⁵

__________________________________

Note：

12 See Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

13 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, pp. 241-243; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, pp. 40-41.

14 J. Reuben Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917: Dealing with the Control and Taking of Private Property for the Public Use, Benefit, or Welfare (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918), pp. 1-125.

15 Clark, Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917, pp. 1-125; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p.243; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch. 2.

16 For an overview of TWEA’s development, see Benjamin A. Coates, “The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the Trading with the Enemy Act,” Modern American History 1, no. 2 (2018).

17 Trading with the Enemy Act, P.L. 65-91 (October 6, 1917) §2, 40 Stat. 411, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305 (2018) (TWEA).

18 TWEA §2.

19 TWEA §3.

20 TWEA §4.

21 TWEA §5b.

22 TWEA §2.

23 U.S. Congress, House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, Report of the Committee on International Relations on H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 95-459 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 4.

24 William E. Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000), p. 1872.

25 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address of 1933 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1988); Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 256; U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. 56.

26 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address of 1933.

27 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting).

28 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1878.

29 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address of 1933.

30 Proclamation 2039 (March 6, 1933).

31 In his proclamation, President Roosevelt did not refer to the “Trading with the Enemy Act,” but instead chose to use the more opaque “Act of October 6, 1917.” Proclamation 2039.

32 President Herbert Hoover had likewise contemplated using TWEA for such a purpose. However, Hoover’s Attorney General, William D. Mitchell, had expressed serious doubts about the legality of such an action. In the last days of Hoover’s presidency, Mitchell said that Hoover “should not issue [such an] executive order unless it was unanimously agreed by [the] outgoing and incoming administrations that it was necessary and assurances [were] obtained from Congressional leaders that [such an action] would be ratified promptly and that enabling legislation would be passed” as there was only a “shoe string” on which to base the legality of such an order. Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 146-147.

33 Emergency Banking Relief Act, P.L. 73-1 (March 9, 1933), 48 Stat. 1 (EBRA). The House, despite having no copies of the bill and relying upon a draft text read aloud by the Speaker, passed the bill after only 38 minutes of debate. The Senate voted to pass the measure the same evening. U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. 57. 

34 TWEA as amended by EBRA. Italics show the language added by EBRA.

35 E.O. 6560 (January 15, 1934). These actions came in the context of greater participation by the executive in international economic transactions generally. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 gave the President the

authority to negotiate bilateral trade agreements, marking the beginning of a period of increasing U.S. trade liberalization through executive action. Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing Over Commerce (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017), ch. 9.

36 P.L. 77-354 (December 18, 1941), 55 Stat. 838.

37 Ibid.

38 Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” p. 1879; Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmyr, Freedom and Emergency Powers in the Cold War (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964).

39 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950); Proclamation 3972 (March 23, 1970); Proclamation 3972 (February 23, 1971); Proclamation 4074 (August 15, 1971). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10267, Definition of National Emergency under the National Emergencies Act, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report 98-505, National Emergency Powers, by L. Elaine Halchin.

40 Proclamation 2914 (December 16, 1950). This emergency would remain in place until 1976 and would be used to justify a host of emergency powers. See the partial list of executive orders issued pursuant to Proclamation 2914 in U.S. Congress, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Executive Orders in Times of War and National Emergency, Report of the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 15.

41 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Trade and Commerce, United States Embargo on Trade with South Vietnam and Cambodia, 94th Cong. 1st sess., June 4, 1975 (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1975), p. 2; 31 C.F.R. 500.101-500.808 (1975).

42 E.O. 10348 (April 26, 1952).

43 E.O. 11677 (August 1, 1972); E.O. 11683 (August 29, 1972); E.O. 11796 (July 30, 1974); E.O. 11798 (August 14, 1974); E.O. 11810 (September 30, 1974); E.O. 11818 (November 5, 1974); E.O. 11940 (September 30, 1976).

44 E.O. 10896 (November 29, 1960); E.O. 11037 (July 20, 1962).

45 E.O. 11387 (January 1, 1968).

46 Pres. Proclamation No. 4074 (January 21, 1971). Although the proclamation did not explicitly refer to TWEA in order to avoid the possible embarrassment of using a statute named the “Trading with the Enemy Act” to impose a tariff principally aimed at U.S. allies, the proclamation was carefully worded to not exclude TWEA as an authority under which the proclamation was issued. When a legal challenge was issued, the Government argued, and the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals agreed, that TWEA was the source of the authority for the proclamation. United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 584 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See also CRS Insight IN11129, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, by Christopher A. Casey.

47 The bipartisan special committee was called the “Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency,” and was charged with conducting “a study and investigation with respect to the matter of terminating the national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on December 16, 1950.” U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in Time of Declared National Emergency, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. iii.

48 U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v. The four national emergencies were those proclaimed by President Roosevelt in 1933, President Truman in 1950, and the two proclaimed by President Nixon in 1970 and 1971.

49 U.S. Congress, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, p. v.

50 Qtd. in Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents, p. iii.

51 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Revision of the Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup before the Committee on International Relations (“House Markup”), 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 1977 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 5. House and Senate committee reports expressed the view that past Presidents had abused the authority to regulate economic transactions in a national emergency conferred by TWEA by using it in circumstances far removed from those that originally gave rise to the declaration of national emergency. H. Rept. No. 95-459 (June 23, 1977); S. Rept. No. 95-466 (October 3, 1977). Both reports noted that President Lyndon B. Johnson, citing President Truman’s declaration of national emergency with respect to Korea in 1950, had imposed controls on direct investment abroad by U.S. nationals in 1968, and that President Gerald R. Ford had used President Nixon’s declaration of national emergency with respect to the balance of payments in 1971 to justify extending the controls and regulations of the Export Administration Act when that act lapsed temporarily in 1976. H. Rept. No. 95-459, at 5; S. Rept. No. 95-466, at 2. More generally, the House report noted that the national emergency authority of TWEA had been used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate the banking industry in 1933 and to impose consumer credit controls in 1941 and by President Richard M. Nixon to impose a surcharge on imports into the United States in 1971. Thus, the House report concluded, TWEA “has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” Ibid., p. 7.

52 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., p. 9.

55 Ibid.

56 P.L. 94-412 (September 14, 1976), 90 Stat. 1255, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq. (2018).

57 Ibid. While the NEA terminated the national emergencies on September 14, 1978, it explicitly enabled the continuation of those emergencies with respect to Section 5(b) of TWEA to give the Congress more time to consider how to address the issue of sanctions and international economic regulation. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) grandfathered powers that “were being exercised [under TWEA] with respect to a country on July 1, 1977,” including those with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) §101(b). The grandfathered powers, however, would require a declaration or renewal. See, e.g., Memorandum of September 8, 1978, 45 Federal Register 40,695; Memorandum of September 12, 1979; Presidential Determination of September 8, 1980, 45 Federal Register 59,549; Memorandum of September 10, 1981, 46 Federal Register 45,321; Memorandum of September 8, 1982, 47 Federal Register 39,797; Memorandum of September 7, 1983, 48 Federal Register 40,695; Memorandum of September 11, 1984, 49 Federal Register 35,927.

58 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, pp. 6-7.

59 U.S. Congress, Senate, International Emergency Economic Powers Legislation, Report of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to Accompany H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., S.Rept. 95-466 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 3.

60 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, 10.

61 House Markup, p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in a Time of Declared Emergency, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., November 1976, committee print (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).

62 P.L. 95-223 (December 28, 1977) (Title I) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act // 50 USC app. 5. // is amended by striking out “or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President” in the text preceding subparagraph (A).”); 91 Stat. 1625, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §4305 (2018); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.

63 Ibid. (Title III); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2 (“Title III of the bill makes a series of conforming amendments to the Export Administration Act, which transfer to that act the authority, heretofore exercised under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act to regulate exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns.”).

64 Ibid. (Title II); House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 2.

65 House, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, p. 11.